

Reorientation of Indonesia's Fiscal Policy: Analysis of Finance Minister Purbaya's Policy from an Islamic Economic Perspective

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Abstract

This study examines fiscal policies during the early tenure of Finance Minister Purbaya through the lens of Islamic economic philosophy, focusing on three foundational principles: justice (al-'adl), public benefit (al-maslahah), and trustworthiness (al-amānah). Using a qualitative-descriptive and comparative analytical approach, the study evaluates the government's liquidity placement in state-owned banks (Himbara), the 8+4+5 stimulus package, and taxation policies. These evaluations are conducted through a series of analytical matrices, comparative tables, flow diagrams, benefit-distribution graphs, and an integrative conceptual model. The findings indicate unequal distribution of fiscal benefits, with corporations receiving the largest share, while micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), informal workers, and low-income households receive relatively fewer benefits. The strongest maslahah effects arise from food assistance and labor-intensive programs that directly address basic public needs, whereas bank liquidity policies generate only sectoral and complementary benefits. In terms of amānah, fiscal governance demonstrates transparency and administrative efficiency; however, reliance on conventional interest-based instruments and the regressive nature of VAT raise ethical concerns. Overall, the study concludes that Purbaya's fiscal policies are partially aligned with Islamic economic values: some policies are consistent, some deviate, and others require reformulation to better serve vulnerable groups and adhere more closely to Sharia-compliant principles.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Islamic economic, Purbaya.

Introduction

Fiscal policy changes in Indonesia always attract public attention, especially when there is a change of leadership at the Ministry of Finance. In 2025, President Prabowo Subianto appointed Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa to replace Sri Mulyani Indrawati. This appointment was not merely a rotation of positions, but was also

seen as an adjustment in the direction of fiscal policy in response to global pressures and increasingly complex domestic needs (Reuters, 2025). Since taking office, Purbaya has introduced a number of policies that are quite different from those of his predecessor. One of the most talked about measures is the withdrawal of government funds from Bank Indonesia to be transferred to state-owned banks, a policy that is claimed to strengthen liquidity and accelerate credit distribution to the real sector (Tempo, 2025).

These initial policies emerged amid Indonesia's still significant economic inequality. A report by the Central Statistics Agency noted that the Gini coefficient in 2024 stood at 0.379—a figure that has remained relatively stagnant in recent years (Statistik, 2024). Looking further, this stagnation indicates that national economic growth has not fully reached all segments of society. At this point, an unavoidable question arises: are fiscal policies oriented towards accelerating liquidity and increasing fiscal capacity alone sufficient to address the issue of inequality?. In the tradition of Islamic economic thought, this question is fundamental. Islamic economics views development not only as a technical issue, but also as a moral and philosophical one. Chapra, for example, emphasizes that economic growth without justice only results in long-term social instability.(Chapra, 1992) Previously, Al-Ghazali had warned that the goal of public policy is to ensure the welfare of society, not to concentrate benefits on a select few.(Al-Ghazali, n.d.) Other thinkers such as Al-Sadr even place the government as a moral actor that is obliged to maintain justice in the distribution of resources.(Al-Sadr, 1979)

Meanwhile, Purbaya's fiscal policy also includes an 8+4+5 stimulus package and a tax reform plan that focuses on expanding the revenue base. Although these measures have pragmatic objectives, such as maintaining the stability of the state budget and increasing fiscal space, many public policy experts warn that tax and stimulus policies are prone to producing injustice if they do not pay attention to the social structure of the beneficiaries (Sriyana, 2002). On the other hand, in Islamic economics, fiscal instruments such as taxes (*dharibah*) and state stimulus are permissible, provided they are formulated based on the principles of vertical and horizontal justice (Hafidhuddin & Tanjung, 2019; Mannan, 1986)

However, one interesting thing is that until now there has been very limited research that directly assesses Indonesia's fiscal policy—especially very current policies such as those in the early Purbaya period—from the perspective of Islamic economic philosophy. Previous studies have only discussed normative aspects, such as the concepts of justice or zakat in Islamic fiscal theory (Oktafia et al., 2023a), but have not linked them to actual fiscal policies that are currently in place. This gap in research opens up new avenues for study: assessing the direction of Purbaya's fiscal policy through the basic values of Islamic economics, such as *al-'adl* (justice), *al-maslahah* (public welfare), and *al-amanah* (morality in resource

management). In light of these dynamics, this paper attempts to provide a critical reading of Purbaya's fiscal policy—in terms of policy orientation, distributional impact, and moral and philosophical aspects within the framework of Islamic economics. This study does not intend to assess the policy as "good" or "bad," but rather attempts to understand the extent to which Islamic economic values can be used as a reference for assessing and enriching the direction of Indonesia's fiscal policy in the future.

Table 1. Indonesia's Macroeconomic Indicators (2022–2025)

Indicator	2022	2023	2024	Projection for 2025	Description
Economic Growth (%)	5.31	5.05	5.11	5.2–5.6	Stable but moderate
Inflation (%)	5.51	2.8	3.1	2.8–3.2	Stable, sensitive to food prices
Poverty (%)	9.54	9.36	±9.3	±9.2	Slow decline
Gini Ratio	0.383	0.381	0.380	—	Stagnant inequality
Government spending (T)	3,062	3,061	3,230	3,325	Increasing every year
Social Welfare Expenditure (T)	460	476	±480	±490	15% of total spending
Debt Interest Payments (T)	405	441	500	±512	Significant increase
Tax Ratio (%)	10.4	10.1	±10.2	±10.3	Below the Asian average (17–20%)
MSME credit (%)	20	21	21–22	<23%	Far from the 30% target

(BPS, Ministry of Finance, BI)

However, a number of academic critics argue that liquidity policies based on large fund placements in state-owned banks have the potential to reinforce "structural bias" towards large corporations and do not automatically increase access to financing for MSMEs—which are in fact the backbone of the Indonesian economy (Ismanto et al., 2024). From the perspective of Islamic economic philosophy, fair fiscal policy must favor the *mustadh'afin* (the oppressed) and prevent the concentration of wealth among the elite (Khaldun, 2008). This means that fiscal policy should not be limited to the logic of efficiency, but must also fulfill the mission of distributive justice.

Then, there was also the launch of the 8+4+5 fiscal stimulus package as an

effort by the government to strengthen people's purchasing power, subsidize MSMEs, and accelerate national projects. Normatively, this stimulus has the potential to lead to *masalah* as described by Mannan that fiscal intervention in Islam is legitimate and even obligatory when it concerns the public interest. However, public policy literature reminds us that large stimulus packages without transparent distribution mechanisms are prone to inefficiency and failure to achieve their objectives (Oktafia et al., 2023b). The functions of *amanah* (trust) and *hisbah* (oversight) are ethical instruments that cannot be ignored in fiscal policy according to Islamic views.

Indonesia also faces the challenge of fiscal disparities between regions. Local revenue capacity varies greatly, with the richest 10% of regions accounting for more than 35% of national revenue, while more than half of the regions still depend on central government transfers. This inequality leads to uneven quality of public services and slows down welfare improvement. In response to this, Purbaya introduced the 2025 tax reform, including expansion of the tax base, enforcement of compliance, and an increase in VAT. Although taxation (*dharibah*) is recognized in Islamic economics, the tax structure must uphold the principles of vertical and horizontal justice (Hafidhuddin & Tanjung, 2019). An increase in VAT has the potential to be regressive and burden low-income groups, which is morally contrary to the principle of progressive taxation recommended in Islamic economics. Thus, there is a moral dilemma between the fiscal needs of the state and the principles of Islamic justice.

So far, studies related to Indonesia's fiscal policy from an Islamic economic perspective have mostly discussed normative aspects, such as the analysis of the concepts of *zakat*, taxes, and distribution, without directly assessing actual fiscal policies during specific periods and under specific figures (Dusuki & Bouheraoua, 2011). Research that specifically reviews the fiscal policies of Finance Minister Purbaya using an Islamic economic philosophy approach has not been found in national or international academic literature. So far, there has been no comprehensive study linking Indonesia's contemporary fiscal policy with the framework of Islamic economic philosophy (*tauhid, 'adl, masalah, amanah*). Criticism of liquidity and tax-based fiscal policy from an Islamic moral-economic perspective is still minimal. On the other hand, a philosophical evaluation is needed on how Purbaya's fiscal policy impacts social justice and wealth distribution.

Therefore, this study is relevant to answer the question: Are Purbaya's fiscal policies in line with the principles of Islamic economic philosophy? What are the implications for economic justice, welfare distribution, and fiscal morality? Theoretically, this study will enrich the discourse on contemporary Islamic economics; practically, it will provide an ethical framework for the development of fiscal policies that are more just and oriented towards public welfare.

Method

This study uses a qualitative approach because its main objective is not to measure the impact of fiscal policy quantitatively, but rather to understand how such policies can be interpreted through the framework of values in Islamic economic philosophy. The qualitative approach allows researchers to explore the meaning behind policies and assess the extent to which moral arguments and policy orientations are evident in official documents (Creswell, 2014). This approach was chosen because it is more suited to the normative-philosophical nature of the study, which is also based on policy data. This research is classified as document-based research using content analysis techniques. However, content analysis here is not conducted in a rigid or technical manner as in communication research, but rather is used as a means of sorting, reading, and interpreting fiscal policy from the perspective of Islamic economic philosophy. This type of analysis model is widely used in public policy studies that require an interpretation of meaning, rather than just numbers (Bowen, 2009).

The research data was collected from two types of sources. First, primary sources include official documents published by the Ministry of Finance, particularly the 2025 State Budget Financial Memorandum, press releases, official statements by Finance Minister Purbaya, and policy documents directly related to government fund withdrawals, fiscal stimulus, and tax reform. These documents serve as a starting point for understanding the orientation and line of argumentation of the government's fiscal policy. Second, secondary sources come from national institutions such as the Central Statistics Agency, credible media reports (e.g., Reuters and Tempo), and scientific literature on Islamic economic philosophy. Some of the main theoretical references cited include the works of Chapra (1992), Al-Ghazali (1998), Al-Sadr (1982), Mannan (1986), and a number of contemporary studies examining the aspects of ethics and justice in fiscal policy.

The use of a combination of policy documents and academic literature helps to provide a more complete picture: one provides empirical data, the other provides a conceptual framework. Data collection was conducted through intensive reading—which in practice was not completed in one sitting, but rather repeatedly. Each policy document was summarized into brief notes, then mapped according to theme. The process of reading policy documents was also accompanied by comparing narratives between sources, for example between Purbaya's official statements and other economic analyses in media reports, to avoid single-source bias. Islamic economic literature is read with a focus on three key concepts: *al-'adl*, *al-maslahah*, and *al-amanah*. These three concepts were chosen because they generally form the foundation of the value of in Islamic fiscal thought and are relevant for assessing public policy.

The analysis was conducted in several stages. First, researchers mapped the

contents of fiscal policy into specific categories, such as liquidity, stimulus, and taxation policies. Next, each category was examined through the lens of Islamic economic values. At this stage, researchers did not directly assess right or wrong, but paid attention to the direction of the policy, the groups that benefited, and its potential impact on economic equality. After the mapping was done, researchers began to establish links between policy findings and the principles of Islamic economic philosophy. For example, can liquidity policies through state-owned banks be considered in line with *al-'adl*? Is the increase in VAT in accordance with the principle of tax justice in Islam? Or does fiscal stimulus really create *maslahah dharuriyyah* as stated in Islamic economic literature? The analysis process went back and forth between policy data and theoretical literature, which made the analysis more reflective.

To maintain the validity of the findings, researchers used source triangulation, which involves comparing policy data with media reports, statistical data, and academic analysis. This approach is not intended to find a "single truth," but rather to ensure that the reading of policies is not based on one-sided interpretations (Patton, 2002). In addition, the consistency of the arguments is maintained by juxtaposing empirical findings with principles in Islamic economic philosophy, so that each conclusion has a theoretical basis.

Results

This section presents research findings based on document collection, official government reports, and other supporting data. The findings are presented as they are, without normative assessment. All results are summarized in three sections in accordance with the fiscal policy focus of Finance Minister Purbaya in the early 2025 period.

1. Placement of Government Funds in Himbara Banks

Ministry of Finance documents show that in the last quarter of 2025, the government withdrew approximately Rp200 trillion from Bank Indonesia to be placed in four state-owned banks: Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, and BTN (Tempo, 2025). This placement was carried out through a government funds placement scheme with a short tenor, which according to official statements was intended to strengthen the liquidity of the banking sector. Internal data from the Ministry of Finance shows that credit distribution from this program increased rapidly in the first two months. However, the composition of credit was uneven. Of the total additional credit distributed by Himbara banks, most—around 63%—flowed to large corporations, particularly in the manufacturing and construction sectors. Meanwhile, MSMEs only received around 19% of the total additional disbursements (Keuangan, 2025).

Himbara banks explained that the greater absorption in the corporate

segment occurred because credit demand in this sector was more administratively ready and the credit risk was relatively lower than that of MSMEs.

Table 2. Distribution of Rp200 Trillion in Government Funds Placed with Himbara Banks

Bank	Placement Value (Rp trillion)	Estimated Percentage of Total	Brief Description
Bank Mandiri	55	27.5	Large state-owned bank, focusing on corporate and retail banking
BRI	55	27.5	Strong base in microfinance and MSMEs
BNI	55	27.5	Focus on corporations and trade
BTN	25	12.5	Main focus on the housing sector
BSI	10	5	Important for distribution in sharia areas, especially Aceh
Total	200	100	SAL funds transferred from BI to banks

Within five weeks of placement, as of October 22, 2025, Himbara reported a distribution realization of Rp167.6 trillion or 84% of the total placement of Rp200 trillion." (SindoNews, 2025). The placement of Rp200 trillion in five Himbara banks has proven to be distributed quite quickly. In the first five weeks, the Ministry of Finance reported that the disbursement reached Rp167.6 trillion (84% of the total placement). The details are as follows: Bank Mandiri, BRI, and BNI each received Rp55 trillion, BTN received Rp25 trillion, and BSI received Rp10 trillion, as summarized in Table 1.

2. Realization of the 8+4+5 Fiscal Stimulus

The stimulus program known as the 8+4+5 package began in late 2025. Based on data from the Ministry of Finance, the total allocation prepared by the government reached around Rp180 trillion. Initial results show that stimulus spending was spread across several sectors with the following composition: National strategic projects (PSN): ±33%, MSMEs and microfinance: ±21%, Social spending, including food aid and certain subsidies: ±18%, Education and health: ±12%, Other sectors, including energy and food security: ±16%.

The Ministry of Finance's quarterly report also shows an increase in household consumption of around 0.8% at the start of the stimulus implementation (Statistik, 2024). This effect is particularly evident in the trade and services sectors. Meanwhile, the MSME sector has seen an increase in demand for working capital, although the actual number of borrowers is still lower than the initial target. In some regions, stimulus budget absorption was slower due to waiting for data synchronization between the central and regional governments—a pattern that had previously emerged in large-scale fiscal programs. The total for packages 8+4+5 is

around IDR 16.2–16.23 trillion. For *the eight acceleration programs in 2025*, MenPAN and Detik provided clear figures for several major programs.

Table 3. Budget Details for the 8 Acceleration Programs for 2025 (Stimulus 8+4+5)

No	2025 Acceleration Program	2025 Budget (IDR)	Main Target
1	New graduate internship program	198 billion	20,000 fresh graduates, allowance = 6 months' minimum wage
2	Expansion of Income Tax Article 21 borne by the government (tourism, hotels, restaurants, cafes)	120 billion	552,000 workers in the tourism & hospitality sector
3	Rice food assistance 2×10 kg (Oct–Nov 2025)	7 trillion	18.3 million households receiving rice assistance
4	Subsidy for JKK–JKM contributions for non-salaried workers	total not explicitly stated (clear: 731,361 recipients, 50% discount for 6 months)	Online drivers, chauffeurs, couriers, logistics personnel
5	Worker housing program (mortgage interest rates reduced to BI rate +3%)	total amount not specified	Workers participating in the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform's Employment Social Security Program
6	OJK SLIK relaxation for worker mortgage access	±150 billion (BPJS allocation)	±1,000 initial beneficiaries
7	PUPR cash-intensive program	3.5 trillion	Construction and basic infrastructure workers
8	Ministry of Transportation Cash-for-Work Program	1.8 trillion	609,465 beneficiaries (transportation & connectivity)

The total acceleration package of around Rp16.2 trillion, the largest component is explicitly rice aid amounting to Rp7 trillion, followed by the PUPR labor-intensive program of Rp3.5 trillion and the Ministry of Transportation's labor-intensive program of Rp1.8 trillion, while the internship program and PPh 21 DTP are relatively small in nominal terms but target specific groups such as recent graduates and workers in the tourism sector."(Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi, 2025). There are also "4 continuation programs in 2026" whose allocations have already been prepared in the 2025 State Budget.

Table 4. Four Programs Continued to 2026 (Already Allocated in the 2025 State Budget)

No	Continuation Program	2025 Budget (Rp)	Primary Target Group
1	Final Income Tax Incentive of 0.5% for MSMEs (extended until 2029)	2 trillion	542,000 MSME taxpayers with a turnover of ≤ IDR 4.8 billion/year
2	Extension of Income Tax Article 21 DTP for the tourism sector	480 billion	Workers in the hotel, restaurant, and tourism sectors with an income of < IDR 10 million/month
3	PPh 21 DTP for labor-intensive industries	800 billion	±1.7 million workers (textiles, garments, footwear, furniture, etc.)
4	Expansion of JKK-JKM contribution discounts for non-wage workers	753 billion	9.9 million informal workers (farmers, traders, fishermen, construction workers, domestic workers, etc.)

According to the document "2025 State Budget Information," state spending in 2025 is estimated at around Rp3,621.3 trillion. Meanwhile, the 8+4+5 stimulus is around Rp16.2–16.23 trillion.

Table 5. 8+4+5 Stimulus in the Context of the 2025 State Budget

Component	Value (Rp trillion)	Description
State Expenditure in the 2025 State Budget	3,621.3	Central government spending + transfers to regions
Total stimulus package 8+4+5	±16.2–16.23	Acceleration package + continuation + job creation
Stimulus portion of state spending	±0.45% (rounded)	Indicates that the stimulus is "targeted" in nature, not a massive package covering the entire state budget

The 8+4+5 stimulus package channels around IDR 16.2 trillion through a combination of food assistance, internship programs, tax incentives, labor-intensive programs, and social security expansion. The food assistance and labor-intensive programs of the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) and the Ministry of Transportation (Kemenhub) absorbed the largest portion of the 2025 acceleration budget, while direct support to MSMEs and formal and informal workers was mainly provided through the MSME final income tax incentive scheme, Income Tax Article 21 DTP, and JKK-JKM contribution discounts (Tables 2 and 3).

3. Tax Reform and State Revenue Development

The results of the tax reform document analysis show that there are three

main steps taken by the government in 2025. First, the government expands the tax base through the integration of taxpayer data across ministries. Second, VAT is increased in accordance with the roadmap that has been set since the previous year. Third, tax compliance enforcement is tightened for sectors that are considered to have low compliance potential.

The Ministry of Finance report states that tax revenue at the beginning of the reform period grew by around 11% compared to the previous year. The increase mainly came from VAT and non-oil and gas income tax. However, in terms of household consumption expenditure, there was a 3.6% increase in consumption expenditure, which is thought to be related to the adjustment of VAT rates (Keuangan, 2025). Meanwhile, data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) shows that low-income groups experienced price increases for a number of basic necessities in the same quarter. However, the government's Ministry of Finance has not yet released a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which these increases are directly related to taxation policy.

Matrix 1. Impact of Tax Reform

Tax Instruments	Affected Groups	Economic Impact	Social Impact
VAT Increase	Low-income households	Increased consumption costs	Economic pressure
Tax Extensification	Corporate Taxpayers	Increased revenue	Increased compliance burden
Data integration	Individuals & entities	Compliance increases	Potential for initial resistance

In general, the results of the study show three main patterns: Liquidity policy through state fund placement was mostly absorbed by the corporate sector, while the MSME segment received a much smaller portion. The 8+4+5 fiscal stimulus showed relatively rapid realization in the large sector, but absorption by MSMEs and social spending was more moderate. Tax reforms increased state revenue, but were also followed by an increase in household consumption costs, particularly among low-income groups. These findings form the basis for further analysis discussed in the Discussion section.

Matrix 2. Mapping of Purbaya Fiscal Policy Components

Policy	Official Objectives	Instruments	Target	Findings Notes
Government Fund Placement in Himbara	Liquidity & credit expansion	Government fund placement	Corporations, MSMEs	Corporate absorption is greater than SMEs
Fiscal Stimulus 8+4+5	Economic recovery & consumption	Public spending, PSN, social	SMEs, households, infrastructure	Rapid absorption in PSN; SMEs still

2025	strengthening	assistance	projects	moderate
Reform	Tax Increased revenue & compliance	VAT, tax base, data integration	Individual and corporate taxpayers	Revenue increases, consumption burden rises

Discussion

This discussion synthesizes empirical findings and the framework of Islamic economic philosophy, which consists of the principles of justice (*al-‘adl*), benefit (*al-maslahah*), and trust (*al-amānah*). This evaluative approach is relevant because fiscal policy never stands alone; it always carries social, economic, and moral implications. Therefore, an assessment of Finance Minister Purbaya's fiscal policy cannot be based solely on distribution figures and macro indicators, but must also consider how the policy resonates with the normative principles that form the foundation of Islamic economics.

1. Justice (*al-‘adl*) in the Distribution of Fiscal Benefits

Empirically, one of the most striking findings is the inequality of benefits from the policy of placing government funds in Himbara banks. Several reports indicate that the corporate sector has been the biggest beneficiary because it has the administrative capacity, asset guarantees, and credit risk that are more acceptable to banks (OECD, 2021). Meanwhile, MSMEs—which in the context of the Indonesian economy are a group with a large contribution but the most fragile support—have been the group that has received the least direct benefits from this policy (Prasad & Zhang, 2021)(Mahmud & Reza, 2021).

Matrix 3. Evaluation of the Fairness of the Purbaya Policy Distribution

Policy Components	Benefiting Group	Less Affluent Groups	Equity Notes
Himbara Fund Placement	Large corporations	Micro, informal MSMEs	Uneven credit distribution
8+4+5 stimulus	Labor-intensive sector workers, food aid recipients	Ultra-small micro businesses	Fairness is sufficient, small scale
Tax incentives	MSMEs (final income tax of 0.5%)	Poor households (VAT increase)	Regressive tax vs progressive tax
Labor-intensive programs	Daily construction workers	Non-construction workers	Fair enough, but sectoral


From an Islamic economic perspective, this raises questions of justice because *al-‘adl* demands that disadvantaged groups not be marginalized (Oktafia et al., 2023b)(Hassan & Aliyu, 2018). When the Matrix maps the distribution of benefits, it shows that the greatest benefits accrue to corporations, followed by formal MSMEs,

Tax reform policies also show preferences that are not entirely in line with *al-'adl*. The increase in VAT, although it increases state revenue, has a regressive impact on low-income groups. In Islamic economics, consumptive taxes are generally considered unfair because they burden all groups regardless of their ability to pay (Siddiqi, 1981). In this case, the increased VAT burden conflicts with the principle of vertical justice, which has long been a concern of Muslim scholars. On the contrary, some of the stimulus programs in the 8+4+5 package actually provide greater scope for fairness, especially when directed at MSMEs and low-income households. Unfortunately, the realization of MSME absorption tends to be slow, so that the fairness effect has not been fully seen in the initial period.

2. Public Interest: Variations in Levels of Benefit

To assess *maslahah*, the sequence is not much different, but the focus shifts to the nature of the benefits generated. The process begins with the policy objective: whether it is to curb economic turmoil, meet the basic needs of the community, or simply help stabilize a particular sector. From there, we look at the real impact that emerges in the field. These impacts are then categorized: whether they are primary needs (*dharuriyyah*), secondary needs (*hajiyyah*), or complementary needs (*tahsiniyyah*). The closer the policy is to primary needs, such as food aid and emergency job creation, the stronger the *maslahah* value it produces. Conversely, policies whose benefits are only complementary are usually not very strong from the perspective of public *maslahah*.

Diagram 2



Assessment based on *al-maṣlahah* shows a more heterogeneous picture. Referring to the hierarchy of *maslahah* developed by Al-Ghazali (1998) and applied in the context of public policy, there are three levels of benefit: *dharuriyyah* (primary), *hajiyyah* (secondary), and *tahsiniyyah* (complementary).

Matrix 4. Maslahah Assessment Based on Public Benefit Impact

Policy	Benefits Produced	Type of <i>Maslahah</i>	Scope	Evaluation
Rice food aid	Supporting basic	<i>Dharuriyyah</i> (primary)	National	Strong

	consumption			
Internship program	Skills of young workers	<i>Hajiyyah</i> (secondary)	Limited	Moderate
Labor-intensive	Job creation	<i>Dharuriyyah</i>	Regional	Strong
Himbara fund placement	Bank liquidity	<i>Tahsiniyyah</i> (complementary)	Sectoral	Weak in terms of direct benefits

Table 6. Compliance with the Maslahah Principle

Policy	Maslahah Compliance	Notes
Food aid	Very strong	Based on basic needs
Labor-intensive	Strong	Direct employment for the people
Internship program	Moderate	Small target
Himbara fund allocation	Weak	Does not address primary needs

Food assistance and labor-intensive programs fall under the category of *dharuriyyah*, as they directly meet the basic needs of low-income communities. BPS (2024) notes that food assistance contributes to an increase in household consumption around the quarter in which the program is implemented. The *maslahah* matrix and *Maslahah Suitability Table* place these two programs as policies with the highest benefit weight, in accordance with the tradition of Islamic economic thought that emphasizes the protection of basic needs (*daruriyyat al-khams*) (Dusuki & Bouheraoua, 2011).

Meanwhile, internship programs have important benefits but are limited to small groups, so they fall into the *hajiyyah* category. On the other hand, the placement of Himbara funds, whose benefits do not directly reach the wider community, only falls into the *tahsiniyyah* category, as it is more oriented towards improving the sectoral and banking economic situation (TF & M, 2016)



An assessment based on public benefit weighting shows that food aid has the greatest contribution to benefit, at around 35 percent, because it directly meets the primary needs of the community. Labor-intensive programs follow with a weight of around 30 percent, thanks to their ability to create jobs quickly. Support for MSMEs and tax incentives account for around 20 percent. Internship programs only contribute around 10 percent due to their limited scope. Himbara's liquidity policy


ranks lowest, at around 5 percent, because its benefits do not directly address the basic needs of the community.

The *maslahah* weight graph clearly illustrates this hierarchy: food aid and labor-intensive programs are at the top, training programs are in the middle, and liquidity policies are at the bottom. This shows that not all fiscal policies have equal utility, as emphasized in contemporary Islamic economic literature (Begum & Rahim, 2015). The government appears to be trying to boost real sector growth and people's purchasing power through fiscal stimulus. Several components of the stimulus, such as allocations to MSMEs, social assistance, and increased education spending, have the potential to create *maslahah dharuriyyah*. This means that this policy is indeed aimed at meeting the basic needs of the community and supporting the economic recovery process.

However, the results of the study show that the distribution of stimulus is uneven. Large sectors such as national strategic projects actually enjoy the largest share ($\pm 33\%$). Although these projects are considered important from an economic perspective, from a *maslahah* perspective two questions arise: who benefits the most? And are the short-term benefits felt by the groups that need them most?. The concept of *maslahah* in Islamic tradition is not merely "economic benefit," but rather benefits felt by the wider community, especially vulnerable groups. If the stimulus is too heavily weighted toward large sectors, while MSMEs and social spending are left behind, then the *maslahah* created will only be partial. The 0.8% increase in household consumption at the beginning of the stimulus implementation shows that there is a positive effect. However, this increase does not fully reflect long-term *maslahah*, especially if the consumptive burden due to VAT adjustments increases at the same time.

3. *Al-Amanah* (Mandate): High Efficiency, Weak Instrument Ethics

The mandate assessment emphasizes fiscal morality and governance. To understand this, the analysis begins by reviewing the sources of funds and instruments chosen by the state. The next step is to look at the effectiveness and efficiency of budget distribution—whether it is on target and does not take too long. After that, it is then examined whether the policy contains elements that conflict with sharia principles, such as dependence on an interest-based system. In the final stage, budget transparency and accountability become important determinants. If these four aspects are fulfilled, the policy can be said to be in line with the principle of *trustworthiness*. However, if there are ethical conflicts—for example, the use of conventional interest-based instruments—the value of *trustworthiness* is reduced.



Al-amanah refers to the principle of managing public resources transparently and free from abuse. In modern fiscal policy, this value is closely related to fiscal accountability, spending efficiency, and ethical sources of financing. In this context, the placement of government funds in conventional banks has its own implications. From the perspective of Islamic morality, interest-based financing (*riba*) is a conceptual problem that cannot be ignored. The principle of *al-amānah* emphasizes the ethics of public asset management, including honesty, transparency, and the moral alignment of policy instruments with sharia objectives (Nasyi'ah et al., 2022)(Ibrahim & Kamri, 2019). In terms of governance, Purbaya's fiscal policy shows good results. The Himbara fund distribution report, which reached 84% in five weeks, and the openness of distribution data indicate fairly accountable fiscal governance.

Matrix 5. Policy Accountability Evaluation

Aspect of Trustworthiness	Policy Findings	Assessment
Transparency	Funding and stimulus reports are published	Alignment
Funding sources	Fund placement in conventional banks	Ethical issues (interest)
Efficiency	Distribution of 84% of Himbara funds within 5 weeks	Strong
Protection of vulnerable groups	Increased VAT burden on poor households	Weak

Table 7. Compliance with Mandate

Policy	Compliance with Mandate	Notes
Publication of reports	Strong	Transparent
Bank-based financing	Weak	Interest elements
Fast distribution	Strong	Good efficiency
VAT reform	Weak	Burdening vulnerable groups


However, in terms of the ethics of the instruments, there are fundamental issues. Placing funds in conventional banks poses a dilemma for Sharia because conventional interest-based instruments are not fully in line with Sharia principles. This is clearly reflected in *the Amanah Matrix*, where fiscal governance is recorded as strong but the ethical suitability of the instruments is in the weak category. In addition, VAT policy is also a matter of trust because consumption taxes are regressive and tend to increase the burden on poor households. The principle of trust requires the state to minimize policies that have the potential to increase hardship for the most vulnerable groups.

Indeed, the government uses short-term, liquid fund placement schemes rather than long-term loan instruments. However, philosophically, the issue of the relationship between the state and the interest system remains. Several countries with Islamic economic models mitigate this problem through Sharia instruments such as sukuk or Sharia-based placements. Indonesia actually already has instruments like this, but they have not become the main choice in Purbaya's liquidity policy. In terms of transparency, reports on stimulus implementation and tax revenue are quite open. However, transparency alone is not enough to fulfill the mandate. The mandate also requires that state policies do not place excessive pressure on vulnerable groups. In this case, the increase in the price of basic necessities for low-income groups due to the VAT adjustment shows that some of the moral mandates of the policy need to be reevaluated.

4. Synthesis Through an Integrative Conceptual Model

The integrative conceptual model formulated in this study shows the relationship between three types of fiscal policy (liquidity, stimulus, taxation) and three principles of Islamic economic philosophy (justice, *maslahah*, *amanah*). This model shows that Purbaya's fiscal policy is not uniform. Some policies are quite consistent with Islamic values, some are contrary, and some fall into a gray area.

Diagram 3



For example, stimulus in the form of food aid and labor-intensive programs shows strong alignment with the values of *maslahah* and, to a large extent, *al-'adl*. Tax policies, especially VAT, show conflict with the principles of justice and trustworthiness (Rosen et al., 2014). Liquidity policy reveals a dual conflict: from the perspective of fairness (due to unequal benefits) and from the perspective of trust (due to interest-based instruments). This model clarifies that fiscal policy is an arena where technocratic considerations and moral values meet, as emphasized in the works of Ahmed and Chapra.

5. Theoretical and Practical Implications

From a theoretical perspective, this study shows that Islamic economic principles remain relevant in interpreting modern fiscal policy. The evaluative matrix used contributes methodologically, as it allows for a more objective assessment of the alignment of public policy with Sharia values. This supports the findings of several recent studies that emphasize the need to incorporate Islamic values into the framework of fiscal policy analysis (Dusuki & Bouheraoua, 2011).

In practical terms, this discussion indicates that the government needs to pay closer attention to the distributional impact of its policies. Fiscal policies that are overly oriented toward the corporate sector have the potential to widen the inequality gap. In addition, conventional fiscal instruments should be combined with Islamic financial instruments in order to be in line with the principle of *amanah* (trust).

6. Final Position on Purbaya's Fiscal Policy

By combining all tables, matrices, graphs, and analytical diagrams, it can be concluded that Purbaya's fiscal policy is in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, there are programs that are closely related to Islamic economic values, especially food aid and labor-intensive programs. However, on the other hand, liquidity and taxation policies show a significant distance from the principles of justice and trust. This shows that Purbaya's fiscal policy cannot yet be said to be fully in line with Islamic economic principles. However, it is not entirely contradictory either. It lies between two extremes: partly in line, partly not, and partly requiring recontextualization to be more in line with the basic values of Islamic economics.

Conclusion

This study shows that fiscal policy during the early period of Finance Minister Purbaya's leadership produced a layered pattern that was not entirely homogeneous in relation to the main principles of Islamic economic philosophy. Using three value frameworks—justice (*al-'adl*), benefit (*al-maslahah*), and trust (*al-amānah*)—this study finds that each group of fiscal policies carries different weights of ethical benefits and risks.

First, in terms of justice, the distribution of fiscal policy benefits still shows

significant inequality. The placement of government funds in Himbara banks provides the greatest benefits to the corporate sector, while MSMEs, informal workers, and low-income households receive relatively smaller benefits. This inequality shows that the fiscal instruments used are not yet fully in line with the principle of distributive justice in Islamic economics, which demands priority for more vulnerable groups. The graphs and analytical matrices in this study consistently illustrate that the burden and benefits of fiscal policy are not distributed proportionally.

Second, in terms of *maslahah*, fiscal policy shows a more positive but still uneven pattern. Food assistance and labor-intensive programs have proven to provide the greatest *maslahah* because they directly meet the primary needs of the community and create immediate employment. In contrast, banking liquidity policies only provide complementary benefits (*tahsiniyyah*) because their benefits do not directly address the basic needs of the public. Thus, the public benefits generated by these fiscal policies are selective: strong in direct social intervention but weak in sectoral intervention and macro stability instruments.

Third, from the perspective of trust, fiscal policy is in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, the government demonstrates transparent and efficient governance, as seen in the rapid distribution of Himbara funds and the regular publication of fiscal reports. However, on the other hand, the use of conventional banking instruments that contain interest elements and the regressive impact of the VAT increase indicate a lack of synchronization between the policy mechanism and Islamic fiscal ethics. Therefore, the principle of trust is only fulfilled administratively, but not yet fully in terms of the moral harmony of the instruments.

Overall, the integrative conceptual model in this study illustrates that Purbaya's fiscal policy does not fall within a specific spectrum of values, but rather forms a combination of policies that are in line, less in line, and not in line with Islamic economic principles. Policies oriented towards the basic needs of the community show strong compatibility, while policies oriented towards macro stability or regressive taxation show a significant distance from Islamic ethical values. Thus, the main conclusion of this study is that Purbaya's fiscal policy has resulted in progress in terms of direct benefits, but still faces major challenges in terms of distributive justice and the ethical consistency of fiscal instruments.

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